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This chapter analyses the various vulnerability and systemic risk indicators, focusing 
in particular on those used in decisions concerning the countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCyB). This analysis suggests that market risk has risen to some extent recently, 
but that it remains contained. The indicators of credit imbalances do not show 
warning signals either, although close monitoring is needed of the correction of 
those that exceeded the risk thresholds during the initial phases of the pandemic on 
account of the sharp fall in GDP. The chapter goes on to review various recent 
regulatory developments and macroprudential measures relevant to financial 
stability. Overall, significant activity is under way on this front, with the implementation 
of reforms agreed before the pandemic and of new initiatives stemming from the 
lessons learned in this crisis and in response to the rise of emerging risks (e.g. those 
associated with digitalisation, new technologies and climate change). 
3.1 Analysis of risk indicators and systemic vulnerabilities
Although	the	tension	unleashed	in	the	financial	markets	by	the	outbreak	of	the	
pandemic	had	been	almost	completely	corrected	throughout	2021,	it	has	risen	
slightly	 since	August,	 prompted	by	higher	 volatility. The systemic risk indicator 
(SRI)1 increased sharply during the financial market turmoil between February and 
March 2020. It then moved onto a sustained downward path from April 2020, returning 
to almost its pre-turmoil level by end-2020 (see Chart 3.1.1). However, since August 2021 
the SRI has risen slightly, owing to heightened volatility in the four segments of the 
Spanish financial market,2 particularly in the equity segment. This higher financial 
market volatility is not unique to Spain, but is widespread in the international markets, 
in a setting in which investors are starting to factor in the possible withdrawal of part of 
the main central banks’ monetary stimuli. Overall, this evidence suggests that market 
risks are currently significant and need close monitoring.
The	 SRISK	 indicator,	 which	 measures	 banks’	 strength	 vis-à-vis	 adverse	
systemic	shocks,	saw	a	notable	 improvement	 in	2021 H1	and	has	stabilised	
since the summer. SRISK3 quantifies the systemic importance of individual banks 
and the banking sector overall, since it assesses and aggregates the impact of an 
extreme negative market event on each bank. This latent risk indicator provides 
1	 	For	a	detailed	explanation	of	the	SRI	calculation	methodology,	see	Box 1.1	of	the	May 2013	FSR.
2	 	Money	market,	government	debt,	equity	and	financial	intermediaries.
3	 	See	C.	Brownlees	and	R.	Engle	(2017)	“SRISK:	A	conditional	capital	shortfall	measure	of	systemic	risk”,	The Review 
of Financial Studies Vol.	30,	pp.	48-79.
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an estimate of a bank’s expected capital shortfall after a hypothetical severe crisis 
in equity markets entailing a correction of its market capitalisation. The changes 
in this indicator since mid-2020 suggest a gradual decline in systemic risk in the 
banking sector, although it is still above pre-pandemic levels (see Chart  3.1.2). 
The improvement in this indicator has slowed down since July 2021, consistent 
with the signs of financial market volatility captured by the SRI.
The	recovery	in	economic	activity	has	helped	correct	part	of	the	imbalances	
in the credit-to-GDP gap and the output gap that arose during the pandemic. 
The credit-to-GDP gap, which is one of the main indicators guiding the setting of the 
CCyB during expansionary phases of the credit cycle, widened considerably after 
the outbreak of the pandemic. As mentioned in previous FSRs,4 in the context of the 
crisis prompted by the pandemic, this widening should not be interpreted as an early 
4  See FSR Spring 2021.
Having held at very relaxed levels since end-2020, the SRI has risen since August 2021 due to heightened volatility in the financial markets, 
particularly in the equity segment. Banks' systemic risk, measured by the SRISK indicator, has decreased over 2021, in line with the 
favourable performance of the markets, although the progression of the improvement appears to have stabilised.
THE SYSTEMIC RISK INDICATOR (SRI) HAS RISEN SINCE AUGUST 2021 AND THE IMPROVEMENT IN BANK SYSTEMIC
RISK HAS SLOWED SOMEWHAT. HOWEVER, BOTH METRICS REMAIN VERY FAR FROM THE 2020 STRESS LEVELS
Chart 3.1
SOURCES: Datastream, SNL, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a The systemic risk indicator (SRI) aggregates 12 individual stress indicators (volatilities, interest rate spreads, maximum historical losses, etc.) from different 
segments of the Spanish financial system. In calculating the SRI, the effect of cross-correlations is taken into account, whereby the SRI registers higher 
values if the correlation between the four markets is high, and lower values where there is less or negative correlation. For a detailed explanation of this 
indicator, see Box 1.1 of the May 2013 Financial Stability Report. Data updated as at 20 October 2021.
b SRISK captures the additional capital for covering bank capital requirements at market value when faced with a significant market shock, expressed as a 
percentage of each institution's total assets. The parameters used are k=4.5% for the capital requirement, C=10% for the market decline and h=22 business 
days for the period over which the hypothetical decline occurs, see Brownlees and Engle (2017) for further details. The SRISK index for the months of 2021 
Q3 is calculated from the values of assets and liabilities of 2021 Q2 with the stock prices data of the corresponding month. The series have been smoothed 
using a three-month moving average. Compared with the results published in the Spring 2021 Financial Stability Report, the sample of European banks has 
been extended to include smaller institutions.
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warning of the emergence of a cyclical imbalance. It is simply the consequence of 
the sharp drop in GDP (the denominator in the credit-to-GDP ratio) in 2020 and of the 
measures to support the provision of credit to the economy. The information 
available for 2021 Q2 shows a significant correction in the credit-to-GDP gap for 
the first time since the onset of the pandemic (see Chart 3.2.1). This change in trend 
owes chiefly to the rebound in GDP growth, although this only partially offsets the 
deterioration built up since 2020. Meanwhile, credit (the ratio’s numerator) has 
stabilised in recent quarters, after having risen significantly since 2020  Q2. 
Consequently, the partial correction of the widening of the credit-to-GDP gap in 
2021 Q2 is a positive signal that the imbalances seen in this variable since mid-2020 
may be temporary. Nevertheless, this indicator remains above the reference 
threshold of 2 pp, beyond which the gap is considered to show signs of imbalance 
in the credit cycle. It will therefore be important to monitor how the correction of 
this warning signal progresses over the coming quarters.
The	rebound	in	GDP	growth	has	also	contributed	to	a	favourable	performance	
of	other	macroeconomic	 indicators. In particular, the negative output gap has 
begun to narrow, with the upward trend observed since late 2020 gaining momentum. 
In line with the expectations of recovery, this favourable trend is set to progress 
substantially over the coming quarters. Nevertheless, it remains at significantly 
negative values that are far from pre-pandemic levels (see Chart 3.2.1). 
Indicators	of	house	price	imbalances	suggest	that	such	prices	stand	above,	
but	 very	 close	 to,	 their	 equilibrium	 levels. It is essential that possible price 
imbalances in the real estate market be analysed, because the situation in this 
market has a particular impact on the credit cycle, as it can amplify the cycle through 
mortgage loans and loans to the construction sector and to real estate activities. 
The Banco de España regularly analyses a series of indicators of house price 
imbalances that measure the difference between the average price index and their 
estimated long-term equilibrium level, provided by various econometric models. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, all the indicators are currently close to equilibrium levels, 
with no signs of overvaluation (see Chart 3.2.2). Nevertheless, these indicators have 
risen since the run-up to the outbreak of the pandemic. Thus, while in 2019 they 
tended to be negative but close to equilibrium levels, they now tend to be positive 
but, again, close to equilibrium. It will therefore be important to monitor these 
indicators closely as well, to determine whether they stabilise at their current values 
or begin to rise to warning levels.
Since	the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic,	notable	differences	have	been	observed	
in	new	loans	to	households	and	firms	and	in	the	contribution	of	supply	and	
demand-side	 factors	 to	changes	 therein,	which	were	of	opposite	signs	 in	
2021 H1. Drawing on econometric models, changes in new loans to households 
and firms can be broken down into estimated supply and demand-side factors. 
The estimates from these models show that the significant decline in new loans to 
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households in 2020 Q2 owed mainly to lower demand. This situation reversed swiftly 
in 2020 H2 and, even more so, in 2021 H1, when such lending rose sharply, further 
underpinned by supply-side factors (see Chart  3.3.1). New lending to firms grew 
notably in 2020  Q2, owing to supply-side and, to a lesser extent, demand-side 
factors. This reflects, on the one hand, firms’ demand for liquidity due to the abrupt 
fall in their income and, on the other, the pick-up in supply facilitated by the guarantee 
schemes and other support measures adopted in response to the pandemic. 
However, this type of lending has declined since 2020 Q3, owing to the decrease in 
both demand and supply, which could point to the waning stimulation capacity of 
the support schemes (see Chart 3.3.2). These findings are consistent with the Bank 
Lending Survey for 2021 Q2, which suggests that concern about non-performing 
loans has led the supply of credit to firms to tighten somewhat in 2021  H1 as a 
The information available for 2021 Q2 shows a significant correction in indicators such as the credit-to-GDP gap and credit intensity. This 
recovery owes chiefly to the rebound in GDP growth, which has not yet reached its pre-pandemic level but is beginning to move closer to its 
potential. The credit-to-GDP gap remains above the reference threshold of 2 pp and should therefore be carefullly monitored in the coming 
months for potential signs of imbalances in the credit cycle.
INDICATORS SUCH AS THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP AND CREDIT INTENSITY HAVE UNDERGONE CORRECTIONS AS A
RESULT OF THE REBOUND IN ECONOMIC GROWTH, WHICH IS BEGINNING TO MOVE CLOSER TO ITS POTENTIAL, BUT
HAS NOT YET REACHED ITS PRE-PANDEMIC LEVEL (a)
Chart 3.2
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a The areas shaded in grey represent the periods of the two financial crises in Spain since 2009: the systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4) 
and the crisis unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic (2020 Q1 to 2021 Q2).
b The output gap is the percentage difference between observed GDP and potential GDP. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See P. 
Cuadrado and E. Moral-Benito (2016) "Potential growth of the Spanish economy", Occasional Paper 1603, Banco de España. The credit-to-GDP 
gap is calculated as the difference, in percentage points, between the observed ratio and the long-term trend calculated using a statistical 
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000. This parameter is calibrated to the financial cycles historically 
observed in Spain. See J. E. Galán (2019) "Measuring credit-to- GDP gaps. The Hodrick-Prescott filter revisited", Occasional Paper 1906, Banco 
de España. Data available up to June 2021. The broken red horizontal line represents the reference CCyB activation threshold of 2 pp for the 
credit-to-GDP gap.
c The area shaded in blue represents the minimum and maximum values of the four indicators of imbalances in house prices. The indicators are: 
i) the real house price gap, ii) the house prices to household disposable income ratio gap, iii) the ordinary least squares model which estimates 
house prices based on long-term trends in household disposable income and mortgage interest rates, and iv) the error correction model which 
estimates house prices based on household disposable income, mortgage interest rates and fiscal effects. The long-term trends are calculated 
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whole. In any event, this effect may be temporary, as the latest data suggest that the 
supply of credit to firms is stabilising.5
Taking	this	set	of	macro-financial	indicators	into	account,	the	Banco	de	España	
has	maintained	the	CCyB	rate	at	0%	and	does	not	envisage	increasing	it	until	
economic	 activity	 has	 returned	 to	 its	 potential	 level	 or	 there	 are	 signs	 of	
imbalances	 arising	 in	 the	 credit	 cycle.	 As it has regularly announced6 since 
March 2020, the Banco de España continues to consider it appropriate to maintain the 
CCyB rate applicable to exposures in Spain at the minimum of 0% to make it easier for 
banks to be able to sustain the credit flow and thus contribute to alleviating the negative 
5	 	See	 A.	Menéndez	 and	M.	Mulino	 (2021)	 “The	 July  2021	Bank	 Lending	 Survey	 in	 Spain”,	Analytical Articles, 
Economic	Bulletin	3/2021,	Banco	de	España,	and	A.	Menéndez	and	M.	Mulino	(2021)	“The	October 2021	Bank	
Lending	Survey	in	Spain”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 4/2021,	Banco	de	España
6 	 	The	Banco	de	España	has	recently	adapted	its	statements	on	the	quarterly	CCyB	decisions	on	account	of	the	
amendments set out in Directive	(EU)	2019/878	(CRD	V)	simplifying	the	framework	for	notifying	CCyB	measures	
in	those	quarters	when	the	rate	for	this	tool	is	not	recalibrated.	Specifically,	the	Banco	de	España’s	quarterly	press	
releases	on	the	CCyB	that	were	released	until	March 2021	have	been	replaced	by	the	dissemination	of	an	updated	
Excel	 file	with	 the	 quantitative	 information	 used	 to	 inform	 the	 latest	 quarterly	 decision	 (available	 in	 the	CCyB 
section	of	the	Banco	de	España’s	website).
In the early months of the pandemic, loans to households declined owing to a sharp contraction in demand, while loans to firms grew notably 
driven by these agents' demand for liquidity and the supply stimulus provided by the support measures implemented. From 2020 H2 to 2021 
H1 the pattern reversed in both cases. There has been a strong increase in lending to households, due to both supply and demand-side 
factors, and a contraction in lending to firms, owing to both a decline in demand attributable to lower liquidity needs and a contraction in 
supply, at least partly explained by the base effect induced by the support measures implemented in the second quarter of 2020.
IN THE FIRST SEMESTER OF 2021 SUPPLY AND DEMAND-SIDE FACTORS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY BOOSTED NEW LENDING
TO HOUSEHOLDS, WHILE CONTRACTING NEW LENDING TO FIRMS
Chart 3.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Cumulative change over four quarters. Breakdown of the supply and demand-side effects obtained using a structural vectoral autoregression (S-VAR) 
model through which the short-term relationships between credit and interest rate spreads are estimated, allowing for simultaneous shocks between 
the two variables. The models are estimated separately for lending to households and firms. Data on new lending in euro area countries are used. New 
lending excludes renegotiations, overdrafts and credit card balances. For further details, see Box 1 in P. Alves, F. Arrizabalaga, J. Delgado, J. Galán, E. 
Pérez, C. Pérez and C. Trucharte (2021) "Recent developments in financing and bank lending to the non-financial private sector", Analytical Articles, 
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pressure on economic growth. Holding the CCyB rate at 0% is consistent with the 
guidance on the flexible application of prudential requirements in response to this crisis 
advocated by the ECB and other EU (ESRB, EBA) and global bodies (BCBS and FSB).7 
Insofar as the economic recovery takes hold, the CCyB rate, no longer in a context 
of crisis, will be conditional upon the path of recovery and the possible emergence of 
systemic imbalances that could be tackled by this macroprudential tool. 
Some	European	countries	are	 taking	measures	 to	 raise	 the	CCyB	 rate.	The 
macro-financial situation of other European economies is highly diverse. Some are 
already in a marked upward phase of their credit cycle, in which cyclical systemic 
imbalances have arisen, and have already announced measures for restoring the 
CCyB. Specifically, the authorities in Bulgaria,8 Denmark9 and Sweden10 have in 
recent months announced that the CCyB rate is to be set at 1%, while those in the 
Czech Republic11 and Norway12 have opted to set it at 1.5%. All these measures, 
which are geared towards replenishing part or all of the CCyB in place in these 
countries at the start of the pandemic, will be effective from 2022 Q3. 
The empirical evidence during the pandemic suggests that building up 
macroprudential	 buffers	 in	 normal	 times	and	 subsequently	 releasing	 them	 in	
crisis	situations	helps	stabilise	 lending	 to	 the	economy. Econometric estimates 
can be made of the probability of different credit growth scenarios over a one-year 
horizon, assessing how they are affected by changes in macroprudential policy.13 The 
results of this analysis for European countries show that expected growth already 
exceeds the pre-pandemic estimate. This is the case both in countries that were able 
to ease macroprudential measures in response to the pandemic and in those that were 
unable to do so owing to a lack of macroprudential space, as they had not previously 
activated such measures because they did not present systemic risk (see Chart 3.4). 





 8  See the	Countercyclical	Capital	Buffer	section	of	the	Bulgarian	National	Bank’s	website.
 9  See “Reactivation	of	the	countercyclical	capital	buffer”,	Danish Systemic Risk Council (Det Systemiske Risikorad) 
recommendation	of	22 June 2021.
10  See “FI	intends	to	raise	the	countercyclical	buffer	rate	to	1	per	cent”,	Swedish	Financial	Supervisory	Authority	
(Finansinspektionen)	press	release	of	9 September 2021.
11  See	 “Provision	 of	 a	 general	 nature	 III/2021	 on	 setting	 the	 countercyclical	 capital	 buffer	 rate	 for	 the	 Czech	
Republic”	of	26 August 2021,	Česká	národní	banka.
12  See “Advice	on	the	countercyclical	capital	buffer	2021 Q2”,	Norges	Bank	press	release	of	17 June 2021.	The	
Norwegian	 central	 bank	 has	 become	 the	 national	 designated	 authority	 for	 decision-making	 concerning	 this	
macroprudential	tool,	having	been	recently	delegated	this	competence,	which	was	previously	the	responsibility	
of	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	See	“New	Tasks	for	Norges	Bank”,	press	release	of	3 September 2021.
13	 	These	 estimates	 are	made	 using	 quantile	 regressions	 of	 credit	 growth	 based	 on	 the	methodology	 recently	
developed	by	the	Banco	de	España	for	assessing	the	impact	of	the	build-up	of	cyclical	vulnerabilities,	the	bouts	
of	financial	stress	and	the	use	of	macroprudential	tools	on	GDP	growth	distribution.	For	a	detailed	description	of	
its use, see Box 3.1,	2020	Autumn	FSR,	and	for	methodological	details,	see	J.	E.	Galán	(2020)	“The	benefits	are	
at	the	tail:	Uncovering	the	impact	of	macroprudential	policy	on	growth-at-risk”, Journal of Financial Stability.
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However, there are significant differences between these two groups of countries as 
regards the so-called “credit growth-at-risk”, i.e. the credit growth rate that would be 
observed under an adverse scenario that occurs with a 5% probability. In countries 
that have eased macroprudential measures, the estimated decline in credit under 
the aforementioned adverse scenario has remained relatively stable since the start 
of the pandemic and is in fact lower than the pre-crisis estimate. By contrast, in 
countries without this type of buffer, credit growth-at-risk is more than two times 
lower and remains below pre-pandemic estimates. Given the similar median growth 
projections for the two groups of countries, it could be concluded that the existence 
of macroprudential space in crisis periods results in less uncertainty about the 
variability of credit growth compared with the baseline scenario and, therefore, more 
stable lending to the real economy throughout economic cycles. 
In	 July  2021	 the	 Banco	 de	 España	 announced	 the	 designation	 of	 other	
systemically	important	institutions	(O-SIIs),	together	with	their	macroprudential	
capital	 buffers	 applicable	 in	 2022.14 Designation as a systemically important 
14  See “The	 Banco	 de	 España	 updates	 the	 list	 of	 other	 systemically	 important	 institutions	 and	 sets	 their	
macroprudential	capital	buffer	rates	for	2022”,	press	release	of	29 July 2021.	
Estimates of median credit growth over a one-year horizon (50th percentile) do not differ significantly between countries that eased 
macroprudential measures and those that did not. However, significant differences are seen in terms of the change in credit that would be 
observed under an adverse scenario (5th percentile). While, under such a scenario, credit contraction is even lower than the pre-pandemic 
estimate in countries that eased macroprudential measures, it is more than twice as high, exceeding the pre-pandemic estimate, in those 
that did not have room to ease such measures.
COUNTRIES THAT HAD ROOM TO EASE MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES DURING THE PANDEMIC HAD A LOWER RISK OF
SEVERE CREDIT CONTRACTION, WITH THIS PATTERN CONTINUING IN 2021
Chart 3.4
SOURCE: European Banking Authority and Bank for International Settlements.
a The bars represent the average for the countries in the group under analysis in the 5th and 50th percentiles of the estimated credit growth distribution over a 
one year horizon, estimated at the dates indicated. The estimates are calculated using quantile regressions of one-year credit growth on variables capturing 
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institution entails the requirement of an additional capital surcharge, which aims to 
internalise the greater impact on financial stability were these banks to experience 
difficulties, and to mitigate possible competitive advantages they might have in the 
markets owing to their systemic nature. The list of O-SIIs has changed from previous 
years because BFA Tenedora de Acciones, S.A.U. (holding company of Bankia, S.A.) 
is no longer considered as such on account of the merger by acquisition of Bankia, 
S.A. by CaixaBank, S.A. in March 2021. CaixaBank’s greater systemic importance 
following this merger entails a 0.25 pp increase in its O-SII capital buffer, according 
to the methodology used by the Banco de España to determine this macroprudential 
requirement. In the light of last year’s crisis, this increase to 0.5% will be applied 
gradually until 1  January  2023, such that in 2022 the institution’s buffer will be 
0.375% (see Table 3.1).
3.2 Regulatory developments relevant to financial stability
Since	the	publication	of	the	Spring	FSR,	some	of	the	exceptional	temporary	
measures	 introduced	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	pandemic	have	been	withdrawn,	
while progress has continued in various initiatives to develop and strengthen 
the	 banking	 sector’s	 prudential	 regulation.	Most notably, the results of the 
stress tests on European banks and the improved macroeconomic outlook across 
the board have made it possible to lift the EU-wide precautionary restrictions on 
profit distribution by financial institutions. This return to normal has been 
accompanied in some countries by the tightening of some macroprudential 
measures, as analysed in Section 3.1. In recent months, the European Commission 
has begun the review of the macroprudential framework of EU banking regulation 
and has announced the legislative proposal for the technical developments for 
implementing the outstanding Basel III reforms in the EU. Other important areas 
of regulatory and supervisory focus will continue to be crypto-assets and climate 
change risks. 
CAPITAL BUFFERS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS
Table 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a G-SII means Global Systemically Important Institution.
b The capital buffer applicable to CaixaBank, S.A. will be 0.5% from 1 January 2023 onwards (to be confirmed in next year's O-SII decision).
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The	 recommendations	 introducing	 system-wide	 restrictions	 in	 Europe	 on	
profit	distribution	by	financial	institutions	prompted	by	the	COVID-19	pandemic	
have been repealed. The economic upturn anticipated by the latest projections, 
the reassuring outcome of the EBA and SSM stress tests and lower uncertainty 
led the ECB to decide15 in July not to extend beyond 30  September  2021 its 
recommendation, in place since the start of the pandemic, that all significant credit 
institutions under its direct supervision limit dividend distribution. In coordination 
with other national authorities, the Banco de España also agreed16 not to extend its 
recommendation for less significant institutions in Spain, which also expired on 
30  September. At the same time, the ESRB also decided17 to allow its dividend 
recommendation affecting various sectors of the EU financial system to expire as of 
1 October. All these authorities have publicly reiterated the need to remain prudent 
in decisions on dividend distribution, equity buybacks and remuneration policies, 
paying particular attention to business model sustainability. 
Various studies suggest that the limitations on dividend distribution have had 
a	 significant	 positive	 impact	 on	 new	 lending	 and	 solvency	 ratios.	Empirical 
analysis of granular bank lending data shows that Spanish institutions which did not 
distribute dividends in 2020 were more active granting loans and, consequently, 
helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the real economy.18 At the global level, 
in countries where restrictions were implemented, capital ratios recovered from the 
falls in 2020 Q1, or even increased, despite the fall in profit. Conversely, capital ratios 
continued to decline in countries where no restrictions were implemented initially.19
The	 European	 macroprudential	 framework	 in	 the	 capital	 requirements	
legislation (CRR and CRD) will be reviewed in the coming months. As laid down 
in Article 513 of Regulation (EU) 2019/876 (CRR), by 30 June 2022, and every five 
years thereafter, the European Commission shall review whether the macroprudential 
rules contained in the EU regulations in force are sufficient to properly mitigate 
systemic risks. This review will allow the use and design of macroprudential tools to 
be examined in the light of the practical experience gained in recent years since 
macroprudential tools were effectively introduced in 2016 and of some of the lessons 
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis in particular. Specifically, the desirability 
of increasing the share of releasable buffers, as opposed to structural buffers, and 
the practical difficulties faced by banks when using their buffers could be considered. 
15  See “ECB	decides	not	to	extend	dividend	recommendation	beyond	September 2021”,	ECB	press	release	of	
23 July 2021.
16  See	“Recomendación	sobre	distribución	de	dividendos	y	remuneración	variable”,	Banco de España statement 
of	23 July 2021	(only	available	in	Spanish).
17  See “The	General	Board	of	the	European	Systemic	Risk	Board	held	its	43rd	regular	meeting	on	23 September 2021”,	
ESRB	press	release	of	24 September 2021.
18	 	See	D.	Martínez	Miera	and	R.	Vegas	(2021)	“Impact	of	the	dividend	distribution	restriction	on	the	flow	of	credit	to	
non-financial	corporations	in	Spain”,	Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin 1/2021,	Banco	de	España.
19  See B. Hardy (2021)	“Covid-19	bank	dividend	payout	restrictions:	effects	and	trade-offs”,	BIS Bulletin 38.
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To	 review	 the	 macroprudential	 framework,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	
requested	advisory	reports	from	the	ECB,	the	EBA	and	the	ESRB. Through a call 
for advice20 addressed to these three authorities, the Commission seeks to obtain 
qualitative and quantitative evidence to support possible legislative changes. The three 
authorities consulted will need to submit their views by 31  March  2022 so that the 
European Commission can propose a legislative reform no later than December 2022, 
which will then be negotiated with the Council and the European Parliament.
Further	 progress	 has	 been	 made	 on	 pending	 EU	 prudential	 regulatory	
developments. Notable in the macroprudential realm is the amendment of the 
regulatory technical standards (RTSs) for identifying G-SIIs, which set out the additional 
methodology for identifying these institutions.21 In addition, the EBA has submitted to 
public consultation the review of the prudential treatment of exposures secured by 
immovable property. Under this prudential treatment, the relevant authorities may set 
higher risk weights or increase the minimum LGD values when these do not adequately 
reflect risk or are inadequate and could adversely affect financial stability in the Member 
State. The EBA’s draft RTS was submitted to public consultation22 and its final version 
is expected to be ready in the coming months. 
On 27 October, the European Commission published a proposal to review the 
regulation applicable to the banking sector23, which includes legislative 
changes to implement the Basel III agreement24,	 considering	 the	 specific	
characteristics	of	the	European	banking	sector.	The proposal aims to strengthen 
EU banks’ resilience, without resulting in significant increases in capital requirements, 
and introduces an extended transitional period, starting in 2025 for some aspects. It 
also sets rules on the management, monitoring and disclosure to third parties of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks, in keeping with the objectives 
of the EU’s sustainable finance strategy. Lastly, the supervisory toolkit is 
20  See	“Call	for	Advice	-	Review	of	the	EU	Macroprudential	Framework”,	European	Commission,	8 July 2021.
21  See Commission	Delegated	Regulation	(EU)	2021/539	of	11 February 2021	amending	Delegated	Regulation	
(EU)	No	1222/2014	supplementing	Directive	2013/36/EU	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	
with	regard	to	regulatory	technical	standards	for	the	specification	of	the	methodology	for	the	identification	
of	global	systemically	 important	 institutions	and	 for	 the	definition	of	subcategories	of	global	systemically	
important institutions.
22  See “EBA	consults	 on	draft	 technical	 standards	 specifying	 how	 to	 identify	 the	 appropriate	 risk	weights	 and	
conditions	when	assessing	minimum	LGD	values	for	exposures	secured	by	 immovable	property”, EBA press 
release	of	29 April 2021.
23  See	“Banking	Package	2021:	new	EU	rules	to	strengthen	banks’	resilience	and	better	prepare	for	the	future”, 
legislative	proposal	of	the	European	Commission	of	27	October.		
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enhanced in certain areas to ensure sounder and more prudent management of EU 
banks. In addition, the European Commission has published a proposal to amend 
some prudential and resolution rules in order to clarify the regime of requirements for 
liabilities payable in chains of subsidiaries (the so-called Daisy chains) and the 
requirements in the area of resolution of institutions of global systemic importance 
(G-SII). This proposal will be processed in an accelerated and separate manner.
Faced	with	the	increasing	relevance	of	climate-related	impacts	on	finance,	both	
the EBA and the BCBS have published reports on this matter. In June, the EBA 
released25 a report on management and supervision of ESG risks. The report includes a 
comprehensive proposal on how ESG factors and ESG risks should be integrated into the 
strategy, governance and risk management of credit institutions and investment firms, as 
well as into supervisory processes. To enhance the supervisory review and evaluation 
process (SREP), in this report the EBA sees a need to extend the time horizon of the 
assessment and proposes including environmental and climate-related factors and risks 
into the business model. Later this year, the EBA plans to publish the disclosure 
requirements (Pillar 3) for credit institutions regarding the risks identified in this report.
In	April,	the	BCBS	published	two	analytical	reports	on	climate-related	financial	
risks.26 The two reports broach: (i) climate-related risk drivers and their transmission 
channels to the banking system and (ii) the corresponding measurement methodologies. 
Although climate risk can be captured in traditional financial risk categories, they both 
acknowledge that additional progress is needed to better estimate these risks. In this 
setting, the reports provide a conceptual basis for identifying gaps in the current Basel 
framework and possible measures to address them. The BCBS is working on a set of 
supervisory practices which it plans to consult on by the end of the year and will 
continue to analyse whether supervisory, regulatory or transparency measures are 
needed. Box 3.1 of this Report sets out the stress tests conducted on Spanish banks 
by the Banco de España to gauge the implications of the materialisation of some of 
these climate-related risks. Box 3.2 quantifies the potential implications of an episode 
of environmental deterioration, which can help measure the impact of the materialisation 
of climate-related physical risks in the future.
The	continued	growth	and	innovation	seen	in	crypto-assets,	including	so-known	
stablecoins,	further	underlines	the	importance	of	the	work	of	the	BCBS	and	
the	FSB	 in	 this	area,	which	 focuses	on	analysing	 the	 implications	 this	may	
have	for	the	stability	of	the	financial	system. Although banks’ exposure to crypto-
assets is currently limited, innovation in crypto-assets and related services, coupled 
with some banks’ increased interest, could heighten concerns about global financial 
25  See “EBA	publishes	its	Report	on	management	and	supervision	of	ESG	risks	for	credit	institutions	and	investment	
firms”,	EBA	press	release	of	23	June	2021.
26  See “Basel	Committee	publishes	analytical	reports	on	climate-related	financial	risks”, BCBS press release, April 
14 2021.
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stability and the risks to the banking system in the absence of a specific regulatory 
framework.27 The BCBS has run a public consultation on its proposals for the 
prudential treatment of banks’ crypto-asset exposures this year.28 In 2020, the FSB 
issued a series of high-level recommendations for the regulation, supervision and 
oversight of “global stablecoin” (GSC) arrangements,29 a specific type of crypto-asset 
which seeks to hold a stable value by pegging it to another asset, such as a stable 
fiat currency. The recommendations promote coordinated and effective regulation, 
supervision and oversight of GSCs to address the financial stability risks they pose, 
both domestically and globally, and are part of a broader FSB work programme 
which will continue until at least 2023. 
The	transposition	in	Spain	of	the	changes	in	the	bank	recovery	and	resolution	
framework	 (BRRD	 II)30 is also progressing. The BRRD II introduced significant 
new features in the EU resolution framework, such as a reviewed methodology for 
determining the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), a 
requirement equivalent to TLAC standard for G-SIIs and the possibility for resolution 
authorities to suspend the contractual obligations of institutions. Its transposition 
into Spanish law has begun with Royal Decree-Law 7/2021 amending Law 11/2015, 
among other regulations, and is expected to conclude shortly with the publication of 
a royal decree amending Royal Decree 1012/2015.
The European Commission has also started to review the bank crisis 
management	 and	 deposit	 insurance	 framework,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	making	 it	
more	flexible	and	efficient	and	increasing	depositor	protection,	ensuring	they	
receive equal treatment. This review is part of the agenda to complete the Banking 
Union, which will culminate in the creation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS). The Commission is also contemplating harmonising insolvency regimes,31 
which would include quasi-resolution tools for the administrative winding-up of 
credit institutions and would ensure the support of insolvency deposit insurance 
schemes as an alternative to paying the covered deposits.32 The proposal for a 




28  See “Basel	Committee	consults	on	prudential	 treatment	of	 crypto-asset	exposures”,	BCBS	press	 release	of	
10 June 2021.
29  See	“Regulation,	Supervision	and	Oversight	of	Global	Stablecoin	Arrangements”,	FSB	report	of	13	October	2020.
30  See Directive	(EU)	2019/879	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	20 May 2019	amending	Directive	
2014/59/EU	as	 regards	 the	 loss-absorbing	and	 recapitalisation	capacity	of	credit	 institutions	and	 investment	
firms	and	Directive	98/26/EC.
31  See Report	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	on	the	application	and	review	of	
Directive	2014/59/EU (Bank	Recovery	and	Resolution	Directive)	and	Regulation	806/2014	 (Single	Resolution	
Mechanism Regulation) of	30 April 2019.
32  See Combined	evaluation	roadmap/inception	impact	assessment,	European	Commission,	10 November 2020.
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